1. From Colonial Powerhouse to Constitutional Compromise
State Upper Houses did not start out as weak advisory bodies. Under British rule, they held massive power.
- The 1935 British Model: The Government of India Act, 1935 set up Upper Houses in six provinces (Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Bihar, and Assam). Only a tiny, wealthy, educated elite could vote for them, and members served nine-year terms. Crucially, these Councils had equal power with the Lower Assembly—if they disagreed on a bill, the Governor could call a joint sitting to break the tie.
- The Constituent Assembly Split: When India wrote its own Constitution, leaders were sharply divided. Supporters wanted a second house to slow down and review rushed laws passed by popular Assemblies. Critics called it an expensive drain on public money. As a compromise, the framers kept the Councils optional and stripped away their power to block laws permanently.
2. A House Built to Delay, Not Defeat
Today, only six states have a Legislative Council (UP, Bihar, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana). While a Chief Minister or state minister can come from the Council, the chamber itself has very little muscle when it comes to passing laws.
- The Four-Month Speedbump (Article 197): Unlike Parliament at the Centre, states cannot hold a joint sitting to resolve a fight between the two Houses. If the Legislative Council rejects an ordinary bill, the elected Assembly always has the final word. The Council can only delay an ordinary bill for a maximum of four months (three months the first time, and one month if the Assembly passes it again).
- Zero Say on Money & Presidency: Under Article 198, the Council cannot reject or change a Money Bill—it can only hold it for 14 days. Furthermore, unlike MLAs, MLCs cannot vote in the election of the President of India.
3. Political Flip-Flops & The 2nd ARC Fix
Because Article 169 makes it relatively easy to create or scrap a Council, state leaders have treated the Upper House like a political revolving door.
- Partisan Games in the South: Andhra Pradesh scrapped its Council in 1985 under N.T. Rama Rao, only to bring it back in 2007. Tamil Nadu abolished its Council in 1986 under M.G. Ramachandran, voted to revive it in 2010 under M. Karunanidhi, and immediately cancelled the revival in 2011 when J. Jayalalithaa returned to power.
- The 2nd ARC Blueprint (Councils of Local Governments): In 2007, the Second Administrative Reforms Commission offered a bold fix. It argued that because literacy has risen sharply since 1947, having special voting quotas just for university graduates and teachers (1/12th each) is outdated. Instead, all states should turn their Upper Houses into “Councils of Local Governments”—elected entirely by Municipalities and Panchayats to give local grassroots leaders a powerful voice at the state level.
A state Upper House should not just be an expensive rehabilitation centre for politicians who lost popular elections. Unless India reforms Legislative Councils into genuine chambers that protect local Panchayats and Municipalities, they risk remaining mere constitutional ornaments.
Mains Practice Question
“Given that Article 171(2) already empowers Parliament to modify the composition of State Legislative Councils by ordinary law, examine the institutional rationale and roadblocks in implementing the Second ARC’s proposal to convert Upper Houses into ‘Councils of Local Governments’ across Indian states.” (15 marks · 250 words)
Introduction: Contrast the weak revising power of State Legislative Councils under Article 197 (4-month delay limit) with their frequent partisan creation and abolition under Article 169.
Body Part 1 (The 2nd ARC Rationale): Explain why the 6th Report of the 2nd ARC called for scrapping graduate/teacher quotas (due to higher literacy today) and electing MLCs exclusively through Municipalities and Panchayats, transforming the chamber from an “ornament” into a true federal voice for third-tier governance.
Body Part 2 (Political & Fiscal Roadblocks): Note that although Article 171(2) allows Parliament to change composition via simple law, state political parties resist losing the 1/3rd MLA quota and 1/6th nomination backdoor (flagged by the Venkatachaliah Commission), alongside fiscal burdens on smaller states.
Conclusion: Recommend adopting the Parliamentary Standing Committee’s call for a uniform National Policy on Legislative Councils tied to the 2nd ARC’s grassroots template.
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