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Relevance: GS-II (Judiciary & Constitutional Reforms) | Source:The Hindu

By the end of 2025, the Supreme Court’s backlog crossed a record 92,000 cases. Drowning in ordinary appeals, the court barely has time to interpret the Constitution. To fix this, experts suggest a bold reform: splitting the Supreme Court into a dedicated Constitutional Court in Delhi and regional Courts of Appeal across India.

1. A Court Paralyzed by Its Own Legacy

Just adding more judges is not working. When Parliament increased the sanctioned strength to 34 in 2019, pendency was near 60,000. Despite raising the strength to 38 in 2026, the backlog surged past 93,000.

  • The Vanishing Constitution Bench: In the early 1960s, Constitution Benches decided about 134 cases a year. Over the last decade, that number has crashed to fewer than 10 annually.
  • The SLP Avalanche (Article 136): Special Leave Petitions were designed as a rare “safety valve” for extreme injustice. Today, they make up nearly 85% of admitted cases, effectively turning the Supreme Court into a routine “court of fourth appeal” for rent disputes, bails, and property fights.

2. The Two-Tier Solution

To clear the gridlock, legal experts propose restructuring the court into two distinct layers, matching models used by successful democracies globally.

  • The Blueprint: A lean, 11-judge Constitutional Court in Delhi would focus entirely on serious constitutional questions. Meanwhile, four or five regional Courts of Appeal (North, South, East, West) would handle the heavy daily load of ordinary appeals.
  • Global Precedents:
    • South Africa: Has a dedicated Constitutional Court in Johannesburg and a separate Supreme Court of Appeal in Bloemfontein.
    • Germany: Operates a Federal Constitutional Court strictly for constitutional matters, leaving other cases to specialized federal courts.
    • USA: The U.S. Supreme Court only admits about 1% of the 7,000 petitions it receives yearly, leaving the rest to 13 federal Courts of Appeals.

3. The Myth of an “Indivisible” Supreme Court

For years, successive Chief Justices have blocked this reform, fearing that splitting the Supreme Court would dilute its power and make it “less supreme.”

  • The Fractured Reality: Advocates argue that the court’s “indivisibility” is already a fiction. Because of the massive caseload, the court sits in scattered two- or three-judge panels that frequently deliver contradictory rulings. A single, dedicated Constitution Bench would actually unify the law and provide clear, final answers.
  • Justice at the Doorstep: Regional benches would save poor litigants the massive expense of traveling to New Delhi just to file a final appeal.

A constitutional court should protect the nation’s democratic framework, not act as a high-priced sorting office for routine appeals. If the Supreme Court does not decentralize its workload, it risks collapsing under the weight of its own docket.

Value Box: Related Concepts
Article 130 States that the Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi or in such other place or places as the Chief Justice of India may, with the approval of the President, appoint. This means regional benches can be created without amending the Constitution.
229th Law Commission Report (2009) Strongly recommended splitting the apex court into a Constitution Bench at Delhi and four regional Cassation (Appellate) Benches for North, South, East, and West India.
2023 Parliamentary Standing Committee Re-endorsed the idea of regional benches, a recommendation that the Union Law Ministry has officially accepted in principle.
The Brazil Model (“General Repercussion”) Brazil faced a similar backlog until a 2004 reform mandated that an appeal must have a “general repercussion” (impact beyond the immediate parties involved) to be heard. A similar strict filter on Article 136 is crucial for India.

Mains Practice Question

“Given that the Supreme Court has self-admittedly morphed into a ‘court of fourth appeal,’ critically evaluate whether invoking Article 130 to establish regional Cassation Benches can sustainably reduce pendency without simultaneously amending Article 136 to curtail the admission of Special Leave Petitions.” (15 marks · 250 words)

Structure Hint:
Introduction: State the scale of the crisis (over 93,000 cases pending in 2026). Mention that SLPs under Article 136 now constitute roughly 85% of the docket, crowding out core constitutional duties.
Body Part 1 (The Fix: Article 130 & Regional Benches): Explain the proposal of the 229th Law Commission to set up a dedicated Constitutional Court and regional Courts of Appeal. Discuss benefits: easing geographic access to justice, reducing costs for litigants, and allowing the Delhi bench to focus purely on constitutional law.
Body Part 2 (The Missing Filter: Article 136): Argue that merely setting up regional benches treats the symptom, not the disease. Without a strict filter (like Brazil’s “general repercussion” test), new regional benches will quickly clog up with frivolous appeals.
Conclusion: Conclude that structural expansion under Article 130 must be paired with strict jurisdictional discipline under Article 136 to restore the Supreme Court to its true role as a guardian of the Constitution.

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