Core question: Can the Supreme Court fix a time limit for the Governor or the President to act on a State Bill?

Syllabus: GS-II—Polity & Governance

Why this debate now? 

Over the last few years, several State governments said their Bills were stuck with Governors for long periods. This created a feeling that elected laws were being blocked not by saying “no”, but by not taking any decision. In April, the Supreme Court (SC) reminded that a Governor cannot sit on a Bill indefinitely—he must assent, return with a message, or reserve it for the President. After that, the President sought the SC’s advisory opinion under Article 143 on bigger questions:

• Can the Court set timelines (like 30, 60, 90 days) for action under Articles 200 and 201?
  
• What are the limits on the Governor and the President when the Constitution does not mention a number of days?
  
• How far can the SC review delays and give directions without rewriting the Constitution?
  Why it matters for federalism: States make laws through elected legislatures. If unelected heads (Governor/President) can delay without limit, then people’s mandate gets diluted. On the other hand, the Constitution also gives these heads a role, so we should not convert them into mere rubber stamps. Balancing both is the heart of this issue.

The Constitutional Provisions 

Let’s first understand the list of options in the Constitution.

Article 200 – Governor & State Bills
After a State legislature passes a Bill, the Governor can:

• Assent → Bill becomes law.
• Return it once to the House with a short message (why it should be reconsidered).
• Reserve it for the President (compulsory if the Bill touches High Court powers; optional in some other situations).
  No time limit is written in the Article.

Article 201 – President & reserved Bills
When a Bill is reserved by the Governor for the President, the President may:

• Assent, or
• Withhold assent, or
• Return (once) a non-Money Bill for reconsideration.
  No time limit here as well.
  Article 163 – Governor acts on aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers (except in very narrow discretionary areas).

Article 74 – Even in such matters also , the President acts on aid and advice of the Union Council of Ministers.
Article 361 – Immunity: President/Governor are not answerable to any court for official acts. So, courts generally do not pass direct orders to them; they direct the concerned government/secretary to process things lawfully and promptly.
 

Two settled principles from recent SC practice

• No “pocket veto” by silence. If you disagree, return with reasons; do not keep it pending.
• If the House re-passes the Bill after reconsideration, the Governor is expected to assent. Reserving it after re-passage goes against the scheme.

What exactly is going wrong? 

Here are some of the recent issues and examples, where the Governor has delayed/ reserved the bills for indefinite time:

• University governance Bill: A State passes a law to reform university appointments (e.g., search-cum-selection committees). The Bill reaches the Governor. Eight months pass. Universities cannot appoint VCs or make academic changes. Students and teachers face uncertainty. This is not an outright “no”, yet the effect is the same—policy is blocked.
  
• Local bodies finance Bill: A State tries to update property tax rules for municipalities. The Bill is returned after long delay with very general reasons, or is reserved for the President without clear explanation. Meanwhile, cities lose a full budget cycle.
  
• Public health Bill: A State introduces a disease control framework after a viral outbreak. If assent gets stuck for long, rules on testing, data-sharing, and hospital reporting don’t start. Public interest suffers.
  These examples show why time discipline matters. A delay of 6–9 months can quietly kill an elected policy without any formal veto.

What do the States want? 

Big idea: The mandate of the people should not be defeated by inaction of the Governor or the President.

1. Fix “reasonable time”: When the text is silent, courts often enforce a “reasonable time” standard. States say the SC should clearly say that assent/return/reservation must happen within a reasonable window (weeks, not months), and if the Governor returns a Bill, the message must give short, clear reasons.
2. After re-passage, sign: If the legislature re-passes the Bill, the Governor should assent. Otherwise, the return power becomes a hidden veto.
3. Judicial review of inaction is valid: Courts need not order what decision to take. But courts can order that a decision be taken, and can strike down undue delay (mala fide, irrelevant considerations, or colourable exercise).
4. Reservation is not for routine disagreements: Sending a Bill to the President should be rare and principled (e.g., High Court powers, constitutional doubts). Overuse damages federal balance.
5. Democratic responsibility: A Governor is not a parallel government. Day-to-day policy is for the State Cabinet, and the Governor should normally follow aid and advice.
   Simple example to remember

• Return with message → House re-passes → Governor assents. That is the clean, democratic chain.

What does the Centre say? 

Big idea: Don’t rewrite the Constitution from the Bench. Fix abuse case-by-case.

1. Text is silent for a reason: The framers considered language like “as soon as possible” and did not keep it. If India now wants a fixed clock (say 90 or 180 days), the correct route is Parliamentary/Constitutional amendment, not a judicially inserted stopwatch.
   
2. Separation of powers(Art 50): If the Court fixes strict numbers, tomorrow there may be complex Bills needing consultation with the Union (e.g., affecting national policy or overlapping subject lists). A rigid number could create “constitutional disorder” and many technical disputes.
   
3. We already have tools: Courts already stop undue delay and order “expeditious decision”. That is enough to control abuse without writing a number.
   
4. No panic from averages: The Centre points to a long historical record where most Bills received assent, suggesting no systemic crisis that needs a one-size-fits-all rule.
   
5. States invoking Article 32: The Centre questions States filing under Article 32 (meant for fundamental rights). It says States don’t have fundamental rights; there are other routes for Centre–State disputes (e.g., Article 131).
   Takeaway

The Union accepts no indefinite delay, but prefers “reasonable time + reasons” and case-by-case judicial review, not fixed timelines by the Court.

Can SC set timelines for Governor and President?

A) Governor (Article 200)

• What SC can do confidently now
  • Say no to silence (no pocket veto).
    
  • If the Governor dislikes a Bill, he must return with a short message.
    
  • After re-passage, the Governor should assent; reserving after re-passage is generally improper.
    
  • In a particular case, the Court can say “decide within a reasonable time” and monitor compliance through the Chief Secretary/Raj Bhavan.
    
  • The Court can strike down mala fide delay or misuse of reservation.
• What is sensitive
  
  • Writing a hard number (like 30/60/90 days) into Article 200 may look like judicial amendment because the text is silent. Many judges therefore prefer principles over numbers unless Parliament amends the text.
    Remember line: SC can end delay and enforce the process, but may avoid fixing a universal number.

B) President (Article 201) — the “Presidential defence” angle

• Article 361 immunity means the Court generally does not direct the President personally.
• But the Court can direct the Union Government/Cabinet/concerned Secretary (because the President acts on aid and advice under Article 74) to process and advise within a reasonable time. This indirect route respects the Constitution and still unblocks the file.
• As with the Governor, there is no number in Article 201. If India wants a fixed outer limit, it should come from a textual amendment, not a judicial insert.

Remember: For the President, the Constitution prefers the advice-route and judicial review of delay, not direct orders or hard timelines from the Court.

Possible way forward: How to protect democracy and the Constitution

A) Process discipline (without turning it into a stopwatch)

• Acknowledge: Raj Bhavan/concerned Ministry acknowledges receipt of every Bill.
• Screen quickly: Check if reservation is compulsory (e.g., affects High Court powers).
• Decide in a reasonable window: Aim for weeks, not months.
• If returning, give short reasons: 4–6 lines are enough—clear, specific, not political.
• Status tracking: Maintain a simple dashboard or periodic bulletin (even internal) so that files don’t sleep.

B) Respect “aid and advice”

• A Governor/President is a constitutional head. Policy is for elected Cabinets. Aid and advice should guide decisions in the normal run.

C) Use courts to stop abuse, not to write numbers

• Courts should order decisions, quash undue delay, and check misuses.
• They should avoid fixing rigid timelines across all cases unless the text is amended.

D) If India wants numbers, amend cleanly

• Parliament can, after debate, insert an outer limit into Articles 200/201 (for example, “not later than six months”). This is transparent and textual, not a judge-made add-on.

E) Cooperative federalism

• Before pushing sensitive Bills, States can consult relevant Union ministries (when there is a national overlap). This reduces reservation disputes and builds trust.
  

India’s Constitution gives the Governor and the President a real but limited role in the assent process. The Supreme Court’s steady line is clear: no silence, give reasons, and respect the House’s re-passage. The Court can force movement—by telling the Governor’s office or the Union executive to decide within a reasonable time—but hard, universal timelines are better made by Parliament through a textual amendment. This middle path protects democracy from delay and protects the Constitution from judicial overreach. In one line: Speed with reasons, not silence.

Exam Hook

Quick Revision

• Assent: Governor/President signs; Bill becomes law.
• Return with message: Send back once, with brief reasons; House may re-pass.
• Reserve for President: Send to President; used in specific situations (compulsory if Bill affects High Court powers).
• Pocket veto (informal term): Not in the Constitution; means killing by silence—not allowed.
• Aid and advice: Normal rule—constitutional heads act on cabinet advice.
• Reasonable time: Not a fixed number, but no long, unexplained delay.
• Judicial review: Court checks process, delay, reasons, and misuse, but does not decide the policy.

Mains Question

Should the SC prescribe fixed timelines for gubernatorial/presidential assent?
Hints :  

Start: No pocket veto, Articles 200/201 silent on days.
Explain: Aid & advice, Article 361, indirect route for President.
Argue: Reasonable time + reasons + judicial review works; fixed numbers need amendment.
Close: Protect federalism and separation of powers together.

Prelims Question

Which of the following is explicitly provided in the Constitution?
(A) A time limit within which a Governor must assent to a State Bill.
(B) The President may return a non-Money Bill once for reconsideration.
 

Answer: (B) only.
Why: Articles 200/201 give no time limit; Article 201 permits one return of a non-Money Bill.