Thesis: A coup may look like a shortcut to restore legitimacy, but it usually deepens lawlessness. If there is any moral space at all, it is narrow: a short, clearly written path back to the constitution, under civilian control and public scrutiny.

Syllabus: GS2(Governance) / GS4(Legitimacy vs Legality) / Essay 

Why now

Days of youth-led anti-corruption protests after a proposed social-media ban turned deadly. The prime minister resigned. The army enforced curfews to secure key sites while an interim arrangement was discussed. This is not a formal coup, but the crisis has revived a broad question: when elected authority buckles or bends rules, can force ever be the fix? 

Recent Data:

• 34+ deaths and 1,300+ injuries reported during Nepal’s unrest before the resignation. 
  
• Globally, researchers count 1,094 coup events (1945–2024) across successes, attempts, and conspiracies. 
  
• Five successful coups in 2024 marked a recent uptick, though still below Cold War highs.
  
• World’s largest displacement today is in Sudan (14.3 million displaced by end-2024), showing how elite power ruptures often cascade into mass human harm. 

Put simply: when rulers bend the rules, does breaking them back restore order—or bury it?

Core question & context

What is an “unauthorised regime”?
It is power held outside the constitution. This can happen in two main ways:

1. Classic coup: A group (usually the military) forcibly removes the government.
2. Self-coup (auto-coup): The incumbent illegally concentrates power by suspending courts, cancelling elections, or ruling by decree.

• Why does this matter?
  Because the debate mixes legality and legitimacy. A ruler may still control the state (effective control) but may have lost the right to rule if they broke the rules that created their office (democratic legitimacy).
• What do regions and the world do now?
  Many regional bodies treat unconstitutional changes of government as a bright red line. They suspend such regimes, impose targeted measures, and withhold recognition until there is a clear and dated path back to free and fair elections. In short, practice is shifting from “recognise whoever holds the capital” to “recognise whoever wins a clean mandate.”
• What about India’s approach?
  India’s answer to breakdowns stays inside the constitution: civilian supremacy over the military, courts to test legality, elections to renew consent, and parliamentary checks to hold the executive to account. This contrast is useful when we judge claims that a “good coup” can save democracy.
• So what is the core question?
  Is it morally permissible to depose an unauthorised regime by force—and if yes, under what tight tests; if no, what are the lawful ways to reverse usurpation and protect people?

The case for

The claim. When incumbents smash the guardrails—void elections, capture courts, rewrite rules to stay—some argue that a tightly limited intervention can reset the system: remove the usurper, install a caretaker, hold credible polls fast. Legal scholar Ozan Varol called this the “democratic coup” thesis. 

Examples often cited. Portugal’s Carnation Revolution (1974): a near-bloodless military action toppled a long dictatorship and opened a rapid transition to democracy. Supporters point to this as proof that, rarely, force can unlock a blocked path. 

Why this appeals:

• Legitimacy rescue. If rulers cancel elections or hijack courts, rapid removal plus rapid polls can line power back up with citizens’ consent.
• Stopping greater harm. Where state violence is spiralling, a brief stabilisation may prevent a worse bloodbath. (This is argued case-by-case, not as a rule.)
• Rare precedents. A few ruptures have opened space for democracy—but even advocates admit it is rare and context-bound. 

The case against

Means shape ends. Using force to “save” legality normalises force as a way to choose governments. The historical record is blunt: most coups do not end in stable democracy. Many entrench repression or “guided” rule, and write new constitutions that lock in military privileges. 

Examples to think with.

• Thailand 2014: the junta’s 2016 charter entrenched military influence (reserved Senate seats; “20-year reform plan”), showing how “temporary” rule can harden. 
• Egypt 2013: ouster promised stability but was followed by heavy repression and shrinking civic space.
• Myanmar 2021: the coup set off a nationwide conflict and mass displacement through 2025. 

What the evidence says.

• Large-N studies find no reliable pro-democracy effect from coups overall; many increase repression, especially when autocrats depose elected leaders. 
• Cascading harm. Coups and counter-coups raise the risk of war, famine and flight (Sudan’s displacement surge is a sobering reminder of how elite ruptures and war feed each other, even if causes differ).

A quick contrast. India relies on courts, elections and federal checks; in parts of Africa, AU/ECOWAS apply suspensions and non-recognition to push juntas back to polls. Both approaches reject coups as a normal tool. 

Way forward

So what should a state—and its people—do when legality cracks, short of a coup?
Think in five lanes: government, citizens, security forces, international community, and aftercare. Keep the actions simple, written, and time-bound.

1) Government’s Approach — fix the path under law

• Name the red lines in law. Define self-coup and other unconstitutional changes in domestic statutes. Make consequences automatic: impeachment, no-confidence, or fresh polls if those lines are crossed. When triggers are automatic, the temptation to “fix” politics with guns weakens. 
• Keep it civilian-led. If the army must secure streets to stop riots, its mandate should be public, narrow, and dated. Put a sunset in writing. Publish rules of engagement. Empower an all-party parliamentary committee to oversee operations and receive daily briefings. (Regional practice shows that time-bound, monitored transitions work better than open-ended “caretakers”.)
• Re-open channels fast.
  Courts must sit. The election commission needs budgetary and police independence. Media must operate under clear, content-neutral rules. Set a public milestone dashboard to polling day: voter rolls verified; campaign rules published; observers accredited; count audited. Small, visible steps rebuild trust.
• Balance order and rights.
  Use targeted curfews, not blanket shutdowns. Avoid internet blackouts; they fuel rumours and panic. If a ban is unavoidable, time-limit it and publish reasons.

2) Citizens’ Way — lawful pressure beats violent rupture

• Use constitutional methods first. Vote, petition, peacefully assemble, litigate, file RTI, support watchdog media. Ambedkar warned: when constitutional routes are open, extra-legal methods are the “grammar of anarchy.” The warning is old, but it fits new crises. If civil disobedience is used, keep it strict and non-violent.
  Accept legal consequences; refuse arson, looting, or harm. Gandhi taught that means are ends in the making. You do not get clean ends from dirty means. 
• Practice civic hygiene.
  Fight rumours. Share verified facts. Protect bystanders. Keep protests inclusive for women, minorities, and the disabled. A movement that looks like society is harder to dismiss.

3) Security forces’ Path — protect people, not politics

• Constitution before command. Soldiers and police obey lawful civilian orders, and refuse illegal ones. Put this in service law and training.
• Minimalist stabilisation.
  Protect life and property; avoid political roles. Publish after-action reviews and allow independent audits of crowd-control episodes.
• No political entry.
  Bar serving chiefs and coup leaders from contesting the first post-crisis election. This reduces conflict of interest and signals a quick return to normal. (Regional norm-setting by AU/ECOWAS points this way.) 

4) International Community’s Duty — align recognition with legitimacy

• Condition recognition.
  Prioritise legitimacy over mere control. Withhold recognition from usurpers. Release it when there is a credible, dated roadmap back to elected rule: election calendar, media access, opposition safety, observers, and dispute resolution. 
• Use targeted tools.
  Sanction perpetrators and corrupt finance networks, not the general public. Support election logistics, independent media, and human-rights monitoring. In West Africa, ECOWAS mixed sanctions and deadlines in Niger’s 2023 crisis—illustrating the tools even when outcomes are hard. 

5) Aftercare — prevent relapse

• Truth and repair.
  Create time-bound inquiries. Compensate victims. Consider conditional amnesties only for non-grave offences, tied to full disclosure.
• Security-sector reform.
  Clarify roles. Put defence budgets under parliamentary committees. Rotate command tenure to reduce fiefdoms.
• Civic renewal.
  Teach constitutional methods in schools and civil-service training. Fund local dialogue platforms where citizens can contest policy without picking sides with guns.

Ethics lens

• Justice: Do the weakest gain safety and voice—or merely get a new ruler?
• Utility / precaution: Since coups usually worsen net harm, the burden of proof for force is extremely high. 
• Constitutional morality: Ambedkar’s line still guides hard times: when legal routes exist, abandon extra-legal ones—the “grammar of anarchy.” 

Exam hooks

Key takeaways 

• Illegality vs legitimacy: Fixing an illegal regime with illegal means deepens illegality; choose legal counter-usurpation and time-bound remedies. 
• Evidence check: Most coups don’t deliver durable democracy; many raise repression. 
• Policy toolkit: Sunsets, monitors, non-recognition of usurpers, targeted sanctions, and civilian-led stabilisation beat open-ended military rule. 

Mains (one question):
“Can there be a morally defensible coup against an unauthorised regime?” Discuss with reference to Nepal’s 2025 crisis (non-coup instability), Portugal 1974, and regional anti-coup norms. (Hints: define coup vs self-coup; legitimacy vs legality; evidence on outcomes; five-lane ‘way forward’.) 

One-line wrap: In crises, choose law, timelines, and sunlight—not bayonets and blank cheques.