1) Why in the news

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Tianjin, China, on 31 August–1 September 2025 for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit and met President Xi Jinping on the sidelines. The public messaging suggested a cautious thaw after the difficult years since 2020. Both sides indicated that any wider reset in ties depends on steady peace along the border.

Core agenda and signals

• Security and counter-terrorism: Call for action on terror financing and safe havens, with “no double standards.”

• Connectivity with sovereignty: Support for corridors like Chabahar and the International North–South Transport Corridor, alongside India’s objections to projects that pass through disputed areas.

• Economy and people links: Exploratory discussions on resuming direct flights, easing visas and rebuilding people-to-people ties—step by step.

• Global governance: Push for reforms to make international institutions more representative.

India- China Border Dispute

2) Background and border status — what the dispute is and where we stand

Short history in plain words: From early cooperation and the 1954 Panchsheel understanding, relations broke down in the 1962 war. Stabilising agreements followed—the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement, 1996 Confidence-Building Measures, and 2005 Political Parameters. Still, friction points remained: Doklam (2017), informal summits (2018, 2019), and then the Eastern Ladakh crisis from 2020, including the deadly Galwan clash.

The core problem

• India and China have different perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) across three sectors:

  • Western sector: Ladakh

  • Middle sector: Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand

  • Eastern sector: Arunachal Pradesh

• Since 2020, multiple rounds of disengagement created buffer zones (for example, near Pangong Tso and Gogra/Hot Springs). These reduce immediate risk but also limit routine patrolling.

• New maps and renaming of places in Arunachal Pradesh are formally protested by India.

• Current (2025): Corps Commander talks and diplomatic mechanisms continue; the aim is risk reduction and restored peace at remaining friction points.

3) Economy and technology — interdependence versus de-risking

Trade reality: Two-way trade is large, but India runs a very high trade deficit with China. Imports are led by electronics, machinery, solar components, and pharmaceutical ingredients.

Policy stance since 2020

• Screening of foreign direct investment from land-border countries.

• Restrictions/monitoring on sensitive digital platforms and selected information-technology hardware on security grounds.

• De-risking, not decoupling: Diversify suppliers and build domestic capacity (electronics, active pharmaceutical ingredients, renewables). At the same time, reopen practical channels—flights, visas, business fairs, academic exchanges—in a calibrated manner.

Near-term picture: Reduce strategic dependence where necessary, while allowing safe and useful economic engagement to continue.

Indo- China Trade

4) Multilateral and regional dynamics — where interests meet and where they clash

• Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Cooperation on terror finance, narcotics and cyber issues, plus trade and development tracks. India stresses that connectivity must respect sovereignty, preferring routes like Chabahar and the International North–South Transport Corridor over projects that pass through disputed areas.

• United Nations and trade bodies: Friction over terror listings and technology-trade measures. India argues for security needs without undermining fair trade and supports wider reform of global institutions.

• Regional trade (RCEP) and finance: India remains outside the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, yet engages pragmatically in other platforms (for example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) when interests align.

• China–Pakistan–India triangle: The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir anchors India’s sovereignty objections and, alongside pressures near Arunachal Pradesh, creates a dual-front challenge that complicates normalisation.

5) Recent trends and key issues — what to track this year

Thaw, but with caution: Leader-level interaction at Tianjin and talk of flights/visas/people ties show intent to ease tensions. Both sides also repeat the condition that border stability comes first.

Border management:

• Multiple rounds of military and diplomatic talks continue.

• Buffer zones remain at certain locations; some pending points are yet to be settled.

Narrative contestation:

• Maps and renaming keep sovereignty concerns alive in public debate.

Five issues to remember (exam-friendly)

1. Trust deficit along the border and limited patrolling due to buffer areas.

2. Asymmetric trade and technology dependence versus India’s security screening and de-risking.

3. Friction at the United Nations and in trade forums over terror listings and technology rules.

4. Cartographic actions (maps and renaming) challenging India’s territorial claims.

5. CPEC through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir versus India’s connectivity alternatives (Chabahar/International North–South Transport Corridor).

The Members of SCO

6) Way forward — practical steps for stability and a gradual reset

Border and institutions

• Refresh confidence-building measures: clear patrolling protocols, additional hotlines, and standard operating procedures for incidents.

• Close remaining friction points with timelines and joint, transparent verification.

Development with deterrence at the frontier

• Build model villages, all-weather roads, reliable telecom, health and education along the border, aligning security with livelihoods.

Economy and technology

• De-risk, do not decouple: scale domestic manufacturing (including incentive-based schemes), diversify suppliers, and use review-based import and investment controls consistent with international obligations.

• Phase-wise reopening of flights, visas and exchanges to help exporters, students and research partnerships—linked to steady progress on the border.

Working with others

• Use the SCO for practical cooperation on terror finance, cybercrime and drugs; insist that all connectivity respects sovereignty.

• In United Nations 1267 processes, build wider coalitions and present evidence-rich dossiers to reduce delays on terror listings.

People-to-people links (conditional)

• Restore direct flights, visa facilitation, academic exchanges in stages, tied to verifiable border stability and compliance with renewed confidence-building steps.

Exam corner (quick recall)

Panchsheel — 1954; Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement — 1993; Confidence-Building Measures — 1996; Political Parameters — 2005; India opted out of RCEP — 2019; CPEC passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and is a core sovereignty issue for India.

One-line takeaway

Normalise step by step: secure border peace first, then travel and trade—while de-risking sensitive sectors and insisting on sovereignty in all connectivity plans.

Mains Practice Questions

Q1. “Border stability is a prerequisite for normalisation.” Discuss India–China relations after 2020 with reference to confidence-building measures, buffer zones and the 2025 leader-level outreach. (250 words)
Hints: Explain how different Line of Actual Control perceptions triggered crises; outline disengagement and creation of buffer zones; propose verifiable confidence-building (hotlines, incident procedures, joint verification); link phased reopening of flights/visas to proven progress; argue for de-risking of sensitive supply chains alongside selective cooperation.

Q2. Evaluate India’s decision to stay out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership while engaging in platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. How can India reduce the trade deficit with China without hurting growth? (250 words)
Hints: Staying out avoids sudden import shocks while competitiveness improves; selective engagement in security and infrastructure forums continues. To narrow the deficit: scale domestic capacity (electronics, active pharmaceutical ingredients, renewables), diversify sourcing, apply narrow review-based controls, and gradually restore people-to-people and business links to support exporters and students—de-risking, not decoupling.