Syllabus: GS-III: Disaster Management

Why in the news?

A concentrated, exceptionally heavy downpour struck the Darjeeling hills on 3–5 October 2025, triggering widespread flash floods and landslides, killing scores of people, destroying homes and roads, and collapsing key bridges — including the iron bridge over the Balason/Balasun (Dudhia) that links Siliguri to Mirik — cutting off towns and crippling road access. Rescue operations are under way and damage assessments are continuing.

History of disasters in Darjeeling 

• A century of events: Darjeeling and the Teesta valley have recorded repeated extreme events — cloudbursts, floods and large landslides — across the 20th century and into the 21st (recorded major events in 1899, 1934, 1950, 1968, 1975, 1980, 1991, 2011 and 2015 are part of public histories and local studies). 
• These are not new phenomena, but their frequency and impacts have changed.
• Scientific mapping: The NRSC/ISRO Landslide Atlas (2023) maps ~80,000 landslides nationwide and ranks Darjeeling among the districts with high exposure — underlining its chronic vulnerability.
  

Why are disasters now more frequent and destructive in Darjeeling?

1. Changing climate and more intense rainfall

• Monsoon and post-monsoon rainfall in the Eastern Himalaya are becoming more erratic and intense — concentrated cloudbursts/short-duration extreme rains produce flash floods that the landscape and infrastructure are ill-prepared to handle. 
  • Climate attribution studies and recent event analyses highlight warming-related intensification of extreme precipitation in Himalayan catchments.

2. Population growth, in-migration and pressure on land

• Darjeeling district (post-Kalimpong split) had over 1.5–1.8 million people in 2011 with significant urbanisation in towns like Darjeeling, Kurseong, Mirik and Siliguri; century-long population increases and recent in-migration have driven construction into marginal lands and increased impermeable surfaces, reducing infiltration and increasing runoff. 

3. Unsustainable hill development and compromised carrying capacity

• Large, ill-planned projects (hydropower, hill-rail and road upgrades, hotel/resort construction, unregulated terracing and quarrying), plus tree-cover loss, have weakened slope stability and changed drainage patterns. 
  • The close proximity of heavy infrastructure to fragile slopes amplifies impacts during extreme storms. 
  • Local NGOs and studies have repeatedly warned that hill development has outstripped the ecological carrying capacity.

4. Encroachment of natural corridors and riverbeds

• Natural drainage channels, jhoras and river sidelines have been narrowed or blocked by unauthorised settlements, solid-waste dumping and ad-hoc roadworks — causing arterial clogging and sudden overflow during intense rain. 
  • Post-GLOF observations showed riverbeds and channels raised by sedimentation, increasing flood risk downstream.

5. Institutional gaps and failure of local disaster preparedness

• Local municipal bodies, hill administrations and intermediate institutions (municipalities, Gorkhaland Territorial Administration) often lack technical capacity, funds, trained personnel and equipment for slope-wise planning, early warning and coordinated emergency response; 
  • District Collector offices are overstretched. 
  • Civil society groups and expert bodies have repeatedly flagged weak municipal preparedness and poor waste management as risk multipliers.

Consequences — human, economic, ecological and strategic

Human and social impact

• Fatalities, injuries and displacements: Recent events (Oct 2025) reported dozens killed and many missing; earlier Himalayan GLOFs and cloudbursts also caused mass casualties and displacements. 
  • Emergency shelters and relief camps get stretched by sudden surges of evacuees.

Infrastructure and economy

• Transport disruption: Collapse/waiving of the Dudhia iron bridge severed the Siliguri–Mirik route, stranding people and supplies and blocking tourism. 
  • Road and rail links are repeatedly disrupted by landslides — hurting trade and livelihoods.
• High economic losses from upstream events: The October 2023 GLOF in Sikkim (South Lhonak) breached and washed away the 1,200 MW Teesta-III project (Chungthang) and caused large downstream destruction; damage estimates were reported in the thousands of crores — an example of cascading losses in the basin that affect Darjeeling downstream. 
  • Such mega-losses show how a single high-magnitude event cascades through energy, transport, and livelihoods.
    

Ecological damage and loss of ecosystem services

• Forest loss, slope denudation, river-bed deepening/shallowing and sedimentation damage habitat, reduce water regulation, and undermine tea-gardens, agriculture and biodiversity that Darjeeling depends upon.
  

National security and strategic considerations

• Siliguri Corridor (“Chicken’s Neck”): Darjeeling hills lie in the broader strategic geography connecting the plains to the northeastern states; persistent road/bridge disruption in the Teesta–Siliguri axis affects not just local economies but also national logistics and defence mobility — making resilience in hill infrastructure a national security imperative.

Multi-pronged strategy for disaster management 

The strategy follows the disaster-risk-management cycle: Prevent — Prepare — Respond — Recover & Build Back Better.

A. Hazard mapping, land-use control and prevention

• Hazard zoning using ISRO/NRSC maps: Institutionalise rapid adoption of the ISRO Landslide Atlas outputs and create ward-level landslide hazard zonation 
  • Prohibit new construction in “very high” hazard zones and require strong conditional permits elsewhere.
• Carrying-capacity policy for hill towns: Set legally enforceable density and building-height limits, floor-area ratios, and slope-cutting restrictions; limit commercialisation of fragile terraces and tea-garden slopes.
• Corridor protection for rivers and jhoras: Legally declare and restore river buffer/corridor widths (no-build zones), remove illegal embankments/dumping and restore natural channels; example: state plans for Teesta dredging to restore conveyance after 2023 GLOF.

B. Engineering and nature-based risk reduction

• Slope stabilization & watershed restoration: Combine bio-engineering (reforestation, vetiver, contour trenches) with targeted civil works (retaining walls, drain works, terracing) prioritised by hazard maps.
• Climate-resilient bridge and road design: Rebuild Dudhia and vulnerable bridges to higher hydrological design standards (account for GLOF/very high return-period flood flows); retrofit vital road corridors with rock-fall netting, slope anchors and adequate drainage.
• Solid-waste & stormwater management: Upgrade municipal SWM in hill towns (segregation, engineered landfills, desludging, corridor cleaning) — poor SWM clogs drains and multiplies floods.

C. Early warning, monitoring and community preparedness

• Integrated EWS for rainfall-landslide-riverine flood: Link IMD (heavy-rain forecasts), hydrological sensors, river gauges and real-time slope-movement sensors to District Control Rooms; issue graded, actionable advisories (evacuate/standby). NDMA & state guidelines outline EWS protocols.
• Local volunteer networks and Gram-Sabha/municipal preparedness: Train and fund community response teams (search-and-rescue, first aid), pre-identify shelters and safe evacuation routes; strengthen Gram Sabhas and municipal disaster plans.

D. Institutional capacity, financing and governance

• Strengthen district & municipal capacities: Convert selected institutions (e.g., Forest Rangers College, Kurseong) into regional Himalayan climate & disaster-management centres for training, research and decentralized planning — a long-standing local demand that would centralise expertise for Eastern Himalaya.
• Fiscal instruments: Use State/National Disaster Response Fund (SDRF/ NDRF) for preparedness capital investments; create a dedicated “Himalayan Resilience Fund” for slope stabilization, corridor restoration and resilient infrastructure.
• Project approval and EIA reform for hills: Mandate hill-specific environmental clearances with stricter cumulative impact assessment, public consultation and binding mitigation measures (no automatic clearances for hydropower, large hotels or railway expansion without risk mitigation).

E. Response & recovery (operational)

• Pre-positioning of NDRF/SDRF resources and rapid deployment protocols: Pre-stage boats, earth-moving equipment, medicines and mobile communication units during the high-risk season. 
  • NDMA SOPs and NDRF field protocols should be adapted to hill conditions.
• Risk-informed reconstruction: After major events, rebuild following safer siting; avoid “back to same vulnerable site” reconstruction; provide planned, phased rehabilitation and livelihood support for displaced families.
  

Way forward 

• Make hazard maps binding for municipal planning and building permission.
• Fast-track local institutional strengthening: build technical wings in DDMA, municipalities and Gorkhaland administration for landslide science and urban planning.
• Invest in cost-effective nature-based solutions (afforestation, contour farming) alongside civil works.
• Mandate hill-sensitive EIAs and limit large infrastructure projects in highly vulnerable micro-catchments.
• Regional Himalayan coordination: create an Eastern Himalayan Centre (Kurseong proposal) for GLOF, landslide research and cross-border river management cooperation.
• Link disaster resilience to national security planning (Siliguri Corridor resilience, alternate logistic routes, pre-mapped defence mobility corridors).
  

Conclusion

Darjeeling’s latest tragedy is simultaneously a symptom and a warning: long-standing biophysical vulnerability, accelerating climate extremes, and anthropogenic pressures are converging to produce progressively larger disasters. The response must be multi-dimensional — technically rigorous (hazard mapping, resilient engineering), ecologically grounded (watershed restoration, no-build corridors), institutionally robust (municipal capacity, regional centres) and politically committed (enforceable planning norms and funding). Without this integrated shift, the hills will remain in a cycle of damage and temporary repair; with it, the region can protect lives, sustain livelihoods (tea, tourism, local industries) and secure routes vital to national integrity.

Mains Practice Question

1. The Darjeeling hills have repeatedly witnessed landslides and flash floods. Examine the key natural and human drivers of these disasters and suggest a multi-pronged strategy for reducing disaster risk in the region. (250 words)

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